Higher Education Leadership of Regional and Local Regeneration Partnerships: Learning from good practice

Consultancy Report

Glyn Owen
University of Lincoln
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Acknowledgements

This study is based largely on information supplied by the consultees listed at Annex 1. I am grateful to them. I am also grateful to Helen Goreham, Dr Tom Kennie, Professor Robin Middlehurst and Rob Robertson of the Leadership Foundation for their invaluable support and advice.

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SUMMARY

Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) are large economic entities, repositories of intellectual and leadership ability, and central to the development of business and of higher level skills. These characteristics make them especially important agents in the economic regeneration of many parts of Britain, a process that can benefit HEIs as much as local economies.

This study reviews higher education leadership of local and regional economic regeneration. It is predicated on the view that economic regeneration is important to higher education leaders: because of the benefits that it can offer to HEIs; because of the extensive high level commitment that it requires; and because of the need to balance these two factors.

The findings are based primarily on ten case studies of good practice spread across Great Britain. The case studies varied considerably in type, but typically involved large-scale capital expenditure by one or more HEIs, usually to expand student numbers and sometimes for research purposes. Simultaneously, however, the projects were intended to regenerate a local economy through their direct impact and wider spin-off effects. All of them were locally important and five were regarded as the most important economic regeneration projects of any kind in their respective localities. Most of the projects were complemented by the direct engagement of senior HEI management in the broader process of economic regeneration.

Whilst definitional issues make it impossible to be precise, the ten projects involved about £1bn of capital expenditure and over 30,000 additional students, demonstrating that higher education has the ‘weight’ to make a major contribution to economic regeneration. Most of the projects required financial and non-financial support from local, regional, national and supranational (EU) organisations (often from all four), and sometimes from organisations without any formal remit to support higher education.

The projects invariably faced opposition, whether because of competing claims on resources from the higher education sector or, more commonly, from the wider public sector; because of resistance from other HEIs or other localities fearing competition; or on policy grounds such as the wish to avoid a proliferation of higher education campuses. Although all of the case studies have, so far, proved successful, they have each encountered major difficulties which in the case of the larger projects at least have been overcome only after years of tenacious effort.

The existence of opposition and the need to secure support from multiple partners made effective leadership essential. The requirements of successful leadership in this field, so far as they can be identified from the case studies, include the following.

• **A credible case based on technical expertise** – the role of the leader being to support and organise the development of the case.
• **Conviction** – in the face of uncertainty.
• **The ability to secure local support**, which is necessary in itself and as a precursor to national support.
• **Negotiating skill** – and although difficult to describe we provide some examples of the methods sometimes employed.
• **Influencing skills**, especially with senior national figures.
1 INTRODUCTION

This study was commissioned by the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education in March 2005.

The study was prompted by the observation that most higher education institutions are engaged in the formal structures of economic regeneration in their respective areas, for instance through vice-chancellors and other senior staff being members of local or regional regeneration partnerships. For some HEIs, engagement goes far beyond an altruistic willingness to help, advise and act as good citizens; it is central to their future development. Hence HEIs are, in some areas, the mainspring of economic regeneration, not simply taking on a comparatively minor role.

The leadership of regional and local governance partnerships can be contentious. Local authorities usually see themselves as having a leadership role, but under the Conservative administrations from 1979 to 1997, business leadership became a pre-condition for various types of regeneration funding. This has to some extent continued under Labour, which has insisted, for instance, on Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) being chaired by business leaders.

Sometimes, agencies or individuals other than local authorities and businesses lead partnerships. In at least three of the ten cases at the core of this study, an HEI vice-chancellor (VC) or pro-vice-chancellor (PVC) chairs or has chaired the main local regeneration partnership. It is reasonable to suppose that the greater an HEI’s direct interest in the regeneration process, the greater will be its willingness to lead. On the other hand, an HEI may assume a leadership role because it is seen by partners as offering advantages such as impartiality, expertise or an especially capable individual leader.

‘Leadership’ is not merely the chairing of partnerships – though that is indeed the most obvious leadership role. HEI staff may lead particular activities within a partnership without exercising leadership overall, for example where an HEI leads strategies for widening higher education participation or for the development of industries where the HEI has particular research strength.

Whatever the form that leadership takes, many and perhaps most HEI leaders will be called upon to assume leadership roles in local and regional governance structures at some stage of their careers. This study aims to examine some of the characteristics of such leadership, and the factors which may have been conducive to success.

The case studies are examples of success, although sometimes of planned and expected success, rather than of success already realised. They are not a comprehensive tally of such cases in the UK, but are sufficient to indicate the national importance of HEI leadership and the higher education projects associated with it. The cases involve capital expenditure approaching £1bn and aside from other benefits they accommodate or will accommodate well over 30,000 students. In three urban areas (Lincoln, the Medway towns and Southend-on-Sea), in Cornwall and in the Highland and Islands of Scotland, the case study projects are recognised as the ‘most important’ factor in economic regeneration; the remaining five cases involve projects that are important to the process of regeneration.

The large scale of the case study projects, and the potential for their replication elsewhere, highlight their importance to the national economy.

2 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY

This piece of consultancy is of value to the higher education sector for five main reasons.

First, because HEIs ought, for four main reasons, to work systematically with regional and local government (including the ‘quango state’), both directly and through regional higher education associations.

- **Altruism** – all redbrick and post-1992 universities (or their predecessors) and many other HEIs were founded in part to benefit local people and industries.
- **To secure the general benefits of raised prosperity** – effective governance of regional partnerships is likely to improve economic performance to the benefit of HEIs as much as anyone else.
- **To secure specific benefits such as funding or planning permission** – in reality this involves intense infighting and lobbying with other agencies represented, as well as the recognition of shared interests. HEIs that are not involved throughout are less likely to secure the benefits themselves.
To improve information flows, so that business and public sector organisations become more likely to sponsor students and commission or sponsor research to the mutual benefit of HEIs and their students and clients.

Second, because high level commitment from HEIs is required for partnerships of this kind. Although HEIs and local circumstances vary, the key governance figures - chief executives of the RDA and the main local authorities (or in London, the mayor), executive directors of the local Learning and Skills Councils, directors of the regional government offices etc. - will usually expect to deal with vice chancellors, and many others will expect regular engagement at PVC level. The case studies indicate the types of commitment that might be required in projects of different kinds.

Third, because working with regional and local government is expensive. Cash outlays may be low, but leadership time costs are high – quite conceivably a quarter of the time of a four-person academic leadership team, plus that of a support infrastructure such as an HEI regional office. In extreme cases, there may be so much work, and controversy, that mainstream HEI functions are neglected. As a result, managers need to balance the need, the level of commitment and the volume of work undertaken. It is seldom possible to quantify the time commitment, even approximately, but the case studies indicate that it is substantial.

Fourth, because many new leaders find themselves in a new and unfamiliar environment when they acquire responsibilities for dealing with regional/local governance partnerships. When promoted to PVC, the head of a school of engineering in an HEI may find it a familiar world, having dealt with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and a range of quangos for some years. But a professor of, for example, English may have little experience of how things work in practice. The examples represented by the case studies in this report offer a useful learning tool for new leaders.

Fifth, because good practice exists but is not widespread. Much of the quango state is new and changes frequently (local authorities aside, none of the key organisations now extant existed in 1991); and HEI engagement is also relatively new. Some HEIs engage effectively, but many see the activity as peripheral. This report aims to help the spread of good practice.

3 METHODOLOGY

In the light of the five reasons given in the previous section, this piece of consultancy aimed to assess practice in higher education leadership of various regional and local regeneration (or governance) partnerships in the UK. Methods such as a postal survey of all HEIs were rejected on the grounds that a large majority of HEIs might be expected to say – reasonably enough – that they were leading economic regeneration without it being readily possible to judge from responses the extent and effectiveness of that leadership.

Preliminary investigations and selection of case studies

As a first stage of work, informed third parties – regional higher education associations, Hefce regional consultants, RDAs and Government Offices for the Regions (GOR) – were asked which HEIs, in their judgment, were proving effective in leading economic regeneration. The aim was to identify, broadly, one case study HEI per region or nation of the UK. Those HEIs and selected partners would then be interviewed to assess the form that good practice takes and the benefits and costs that result for the HEI. It was hoped that eight to twelve case studies of good practice would be reviewed; in fact ten were examined – summaries of each of these can be found in the appendices of this paper (pages 21-39).

It might have been desirable in principle to select the best examples in the UK as case studies. This would, however, have been impossible in a study of this type. A definition of ‘best’ would have been needed; every HEI would need to have been examined, at least superficially; many, doubtless, would claim to be amongst the best and complex judgments would have had to be made about the competing claims. As a result, this simpler process described above was adopted.

From the point of view of HEIs in England there is a regional infrastructure comprising RDAs, Government Offices for the Regions, Hefce regional consultants, and regional higher education associations. Every effort was made to contact each of these organisations, in each region, by phone to seek their views of the most effective examples of HEI engagement in regeneration in their respective regions. Phone contact was attempted with the Hefce regional consultant (there is, essentially, one consultant per region), the chief executive of the regional higher education association, and with the most senior member of staff responsible for higher education in the GOR and RDA, typically a ‘second tier’ official reporting directly to the GOR Regional Director or the RDA Chief Executive.
It was not possible to consult all of these organisations in each region, and some that were consulted did not offer a view; those offering material help are listed at Annex 1 (pages 40-41).

Initial phone contacts were followed variously by email exchanges; face-to-face meetings and telephone interviews; and, in the case of the Hefce regional consultants, attendance at one of their regular meetings to discuss in general the topic of this report and to seek examples. These consultees in turn nominated other relevant contacts, from local authorities or regeneration partnerships, seven of whom were actually consulted, again as listed in Annex 1.

The selection procedure for Wales and Scotland was different. In respect of Wales, desk research was conducted and led to the identification of the Community University of the Valleys as a case study, this choice being reinforced by the extreme deprivation of the ‘Valleys’ area of South Wales. In respect of Scotland, the UHI Millennium Institute was included at the specific suggestion of the Leadership Foundation.

The different circumstances applying to economic regeneration in Northern Ireland led to a decision to confine the study to Great Britain.

In some regions, more than one recommendation was made and an element of judgment was exercised by the author in making the final choice, a choice that was endorsed by the Leadership Foundation. Resources were not available for a formal assessment of which examples were the ‘best’ in each region; nor, in the author’s view, could any such assessment have reached conclusions of any degree of certainty.

It is arguable, moreover, that the regional approach was itself not ideal: Region X might have had several cases that were better than any in Region Y. Moreover, even a well-informed assurance that a particular activity is successful may be mistaken, so there was no absolute guarantee, in advance, that all of the case studies would indeed represent good practice.

In the end, however, the ten case studies listed in Table 1 opposite were selected. There is no suggestion that they are the ‘top ten’, but most commentators would agree that they include many of the UK’s best examples of higher education leadership of economic regeneration.

Table 1 lists the project area, the region or nation in which the case study is located, and the HEIs involved. The region or nation of location presents no difficulty, but the term ‘area’ deserves further clarification. All of the case study projects, with the possible exception of the Community University of the Valleys, are intended to serve nationwide or even worldwide markets. Equally each has a particular interest in, and relevance to, its local area. But ‘area’ could be defined in varying ways, even assuming that administrative boundaries are to be used at all. For instance, local area for Newcastle University could be the city of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, or the former metropolitan county of Tyne and Wear, or, conceivably, the former county of Northumberland. In each case a judgment has been made about which seems the most satisfactory area definition.

Investigation of case studies

Approximately two days of research time was available for each case study. During this time, relevant documents were reviewed and individuals associated with the case studies were interviewed.

In every case study the key interviewee was the individual member of HEI staff most closely connected with, and responsible for, the case study project, as shown in Annex 1. Three of the key interviewees were heads of their respective HEIs (vice chancellors or principals): five were deputy or pro-vice-chancellors, and two were staff at a lower level than this.

In addition to these key interviews, varying numbers of other individuals were interviewed, both in the HEIs and in partner organisations. Use was also made, of the information gained from ‘regional’ consultees in the previous stage. The intention was to gain a balanced view of each case study.

The case studies were written up as shown in Section 7. They were restricted to about 1,000 words in length, in part because of time restrictions but also to keep this report to a reasonable length. The case studies comment first on the economic regeneration context in which they are respectively set, before describing the higher education project itself.

Analysis

Section 5 (page 12) of this report attempts to identify general lessons from the case studies. A particular feature of Section 5 is that it uses material mentioned in confidence (see below) by interviewees to reach general conclusions without breaching the assurances of confidentiality given, when sought, to interviewees.

Limitations

The study operated under certain limitations. Each case study is large and complex and has been the subject of extensive
planning and evaluation, as befits projects of this size. In round terms the projects envisage, in total, £1bn of capital expenditure, over 30,000 students, and major contributions to research. They involve 17 HEIs directly and several others to a lesser degree, as well as numerous public sector agencies. Each is a complex project to which many individuals within HEIs and their partner agencies have contributed. The study hence describes the main features of each case study and how they each relate to the wider economies that they influence; it does not aim to give a detailed examination of each case study.

The study also identified a hidden agenda of inter-organisational conflict as well as the story in the public domain. The individuals consulted for this study were mainly describing matters of public record, and the documents used are in the public domain. However some individuals interviewed for this study were willing to discuss inter-organisational conflict and its resolution, under the cloak of confidentiality. In such cases, it was explained that the case study relating to that project would not refer to the confidential matters, but that the general chapters might refer to those matters without disclosing anything that could allow the institutions in question to be identified. While confidential material has informed the general findings in Section 5, it has for this reason been excluded from the case studies themselves.

**Terminology**
Institutions are referred to by their official names in 2005/6.

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### List of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA (REGION OR NATION)</th>
<th>HEI(S)</th>
<th>NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Yorkshire (Yorkshire and Humber)</td>
<td>University of Sheffield</td>
<td>Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall (South West)</td>
<td>University of Exeter University College Falmouth University of Plymouth</td>
<td>Combined Universities in Cornwall (CUC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Wales (Wales)</td>
<td>University of Glamorgan Open University University of Wales, Newport University of Wales, Swansea</td>
<td>Community University of the Valleys (CUV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lancashire (North West)</td>
<td>University of Central Lancashire and other HEIs</td>
<td>Higher Education in East Lancashire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medway (South East)</td>
<td>Canterbury Christ Church University University of Greenwich University of Kent</td>
<td>Medway Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southend-on-Sea (East of England)</td>
<td>University of Essex</td>
<td>Southend-on-Sea Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent (West Midlands)</td>
<td>University of Staffordshire</td>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent University Quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire (East Midlands)</td>
<td>University of Lincoln</td>
<td>University of Lincoln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyneside (North East)</td>
<td>Newcastle University</td>
<td>Newcastle University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands and Islands (Scotland)</td>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 See the case study itself for a detailed note on ‘naming.’
4 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR LOCAL REGENERATION PARTNERSHIPS

The UK economy is far from homogeneous: one region differs in prosperity from another, and differences within regions are still greater than those between regions. If at times the differences have seemed to become less, for some years now they seem to have grown greater.

The most striking change in the past century has been the switch in prosperity from the North to the South. In 1890, say, the north and Midlands of England, and the industrial areas of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, still led the world in industry, whilst rural areas were mired in agricultural recession and seemed to offer no more than a reserve of population on which the growing cities might draw. London, of course, was an exception to the pattern.

After the First World War, the pattern changed. The population of the northern cities, ceased to grow, and their industries to varying degrees declined, especially during the 1930s. In some areas the recession reached extraordinary proportions, leading to the early experiments in economic regeneration, notably the designation of West Cumbria, North East England, South Wales and Clydeside as areas to receive special assistance under the Special Areas Act, 1934. The difficulties of the North were concealed by the Second World War and by the high pressure of demand that persisted for many years afterwards, but re-emerged from the mid-1960s onwards, and especially during the years of poor economic performance between 1973 and 1992.

In this latter period, the traditional structure of the manufacturing regions changed fundamentally as employment in industries such as coal mining, steel, textiles, shipbuilding, and engineering fell sharply, and in many areas disappeared altogether. One consequence of the change was a rapid rise in unemployment, which peaked at about three million in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s.

As the economic difficulties persisted, their wider social effects became increasingly evident. The loss of traditional forms of employment seems to have helped to cause, and was certainly associated with, deteriorating housing, relatively poor health and education statistics, and high crime rates. The combination of these and other problems in particular areas, especially in cities, began to be called ‘social exclusion’ reflecting the perception that many residents were excluded from the mainstream of society.

Increasing public concern was raised further by serious rioting in various cities, most famously in Toxteth, Liverpool, in 1981. The Toxteth riots led to Lord Heseltine, then secretary of state for the environment in the first Thatcher government, moving to Merseyside for three weeks to analyse the difficulties and to identify how to regenerate Liverpool and other cities.

In the early 1980s, the main policy for regenerating urban areas was the Urban Programme, which allocated funding to local authorities based on measurements of their needs. A critical objection raised by (Conservative) central government to the Urban Programme was that it was ‘top-down’ and bureaucratic. Funds were allocated to projects and there was little follow-up of the outcomes achieved. As a result, money was spent to little effect. This, of course, was one symptom of the Conservative lack of confidence in the abilities of local government.

It was against this background that Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) were established as non-departmental public bodies (quangos), under the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, as limited-life bodies with a broad remit to secure the regeneration of their designated areas. Board members of UDCs were nominated by the Government and were, primarily, drawn from business. Their presence was often resented by their ‘host’ local authorities.

After the 1987 election, and especially under the Major government from 1990 onwards, the Conservative approach to local government gradually changed. There was, perhaps, a feeling in Government that measures such as ‘right to buy’, rate capping, Local Management of Schools, abolition of the Greater London Council and the metropolitan counties, and the removal of colleges and polytechnics from local authority control had trimmed local government powers sufficiently.

Whatever the reasons, government began to recognise that local authorities with their status as democratically-elected bodies, their large staffs and technical expertise, and their valuable capital assets, were indispensable to the process of...
economic regeneration. If there was to be no return to measures such as the Urban Programme, controlled solely by local authorities, there was recognition that local authorities as well as business and others, had a role to play. ‘Partnership’ in economic regeneration was born.

The earliest exercises in partnership were few in number and inspired partly by local government fear of imposition of UDCs and partly by opportunities for property development. The classic case was the Birmingham Heartlands Partnership, established in 1987 jointly between Birmingham City Council and the private sector, though with the latter in a majority.

Partnership was given limited central government blessing by the first round of City Challenge in 1991. The first round of City Challenge invited cross-sectoral Partnerships from 15 areas to bid for £37.5m (each) of regeneration funding spread over five years. They were chosen to represent the wide range of circumstances across the country and their ability to work up imaginative plans quickly. Eleven areas were successful and became ‘Pacemakers’ to pilot the initiative. A further 20 areas were selected, again on a competitive basis, in a second round.

City Challenge was innovative because it was competitive, adopted a comprehensive and strategic approach, targeted specific areas, was time limited and output driven, and based upon partnership.

City Challenge may be regarded as having inaugurated the modern pattern of partnership working, a pattern that has been reinforced by new developments under Labour, such as the formation of Regional Development Agencies and their operation of a single pool of regeneration funding for each region.

HEIs, cautiously at first, have become involved as partners in regeneration. Prior to City Challenge, few HEIs were involved, but most are now active partners. The character of that involvement has also changed in the last few years. Until, say, 2001, regeneration partnerships tended to emphasise conventional public sector regeneration activity such as land reclamation, oriented to securing private sector investment, and the funds available to the further and higher education sectors for capital investment and growth were tightly restricted. After the 2001 general election, however, a major programme of expansion in Further and Higher education began, at the same time as the boom in private investment, and especially foreign direct investment, began to cool.

As a result, further and higher education investment is increasingly seen by local authorities and regeneration agencies as being in itself a mechanism for securing regeneration and a catalyst for attracting difficult to secure private investment.

HE involvement in partnership structures now operates at both regional and local levels, with the latter being the more important. Each region has a regional higher education association (terminology differs somewhat from region to region) and this is a natural entity through which higher education engagement at regional level is effected and co-ordinated. Even more importantly, the Regional Development Agency will always have a senior higher education representative on its Board4, typically the vice-chancellor or principal of an HEI. Where higher education representation is required on other regional entities, this is likely to be co-ordinated through the regional higher education association.

The local tier is usually of more direct importance to an HEI. A recent development is that each locality is now required to have a ‘Local Strategic Partnership’ (LSP), usually developed from an earlier regeneration partnership. These multi-agency bodies match the boundaries of local authorities; their aim is to bring together public, private and voluntary sector representatives to tackle large or small-scale multi-dimensional problems affecting their community. In cities and towns with universities, representation on the LSP is normally at vice-chancellor or pro-vice-chancellor level. In some cases, the higher education representative chairs the LSP.

The current activities of HEIs will be recognised as being of great importance to the local economy. Their employees and students bring major economic benefits, and the education, research and advisory services that they can offer to local businesses and public sector bodies will likewise be valuable. But the implications of partnership for continuing activities will typically be modest. Sometimes, new courses or services that, perhaps, had not occurred to the HEI may be offered at partners’ behest, but change of this kind is likely to be on a small scale relatively to the size of the institution.

Partnership has a major impact where new projects, usually involving major capital expenditure, are in prospect. In the

4 In London, the HE representative has observer status.
interests of the local economy, partnerships will normally encourage HEIs to maximise their expansion and capital investment and to shape them to meet wider planning and regeneration goals: for instance, by locating in an area requiring urban renewal. In exchange, the HEI can look to its partners for a supportive attitude to planning decisions – and whilst the local authority is the planning authority, many others influence planning decisions and the authority’s decision will seldom be ‘final’ for: a major project; direct financial support; and support in the funding and other applications that major projects commonly require.

This process of interaction for mutual benefit between an HEI and its partners is a fruitful avenue for HEI development on the one hand and economic regeneration on the other, and forms the background to the case study projects.

5 KEY FINDINGS

In this section we can generalise from the material presented in the ten case studies. The case studies were selected on the advice of, variously, Hefce regional consultants, RDAs, GOR and Regional University Associations as representing good practice in Higher Education leadership of regional partnerships, as described more fully in Section 3. One case study was chosen from each region or nation of the UK, excepting London and Northern Ireland (though in respect of London, the University of Greenwich is a key partner in the Medway Campus case study, which is effectively a London/South-East case study).

Because of the close connection between regional and local partnerships and the process of economic regeneration, and because economic regeneration is pursued more strongly in areas of economic difficulty, it was always likely that case studies would be drawn, predominantly, from such areas. But this was not inevitable; there is nothing unlikely in an HEI leading a process of building on economic success, rather than one of overcoming relative economic failure.

Notwithstanding this point, all ten case studies are in fact from areas of economic difficulty. The best single measure of difficulty is that every case study is located in an area where gross domestic product (GDP) per head is substantially lower than the national average, and in nine cases below the average for the region in which the case study is located, as indicated in Table 2 opposite.

Eight case studies involve large scale capital investment, averaging around £100m each – indeed £100m seems to be the ‘going rate’ for major capital investment projects. In six of these eight cases, all or most of the capital investment has been incurred or is firmly committed. The other two cases (Stoke-on-Trent University Quarter and Newcastle University) were at an earlier stage and had, at the time of the research, secured firm funding commitments for only part of their planned capital expenditure. Six of the eight case study projects were intended to accommodate thousands – sometimes many thousands – of students. The two exceptions were the Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre and the Science City project (Newcastle University), which are research facilities with few students.

The two remaining case studies are different in character. The Community University of the Valleys in South Wales is small scale (no significant capital investment and hundreds rather than thousands of students) and focused on the most difficult to reach groups in deprived areas. And the higher education in the East Lancashire project is at a relatively early planning stage and envisages using the existing physical assets of East Lancashire colleges and surrounding universities; capital investment is thus likely to be small though the numbers of students involved may be large. Table 3 on page 14 summarises some of the main characteristics of the case studies. Capital expenditure figures are intended to show expenditure once all plans are complete and to include facilities such as halls of residence, but to exclude associated developments such as business space. The figures should be regarded as indicative only. Of the £914m shown in the table (a spuriously precise figure) something over £600m was already incurred or firmly committed, whilst the balance of about £300m was the subject of bidding or similar processes. Student headcounts (they are not full time equivalents (FTEs)) are intended to be incremental numbers associated with the projects in question. Where no figure is shown, this may mean, as at AMRC for instance, that student numbers are negligible, or merely that no figure is available. The purpose of presenting these figures is to indicate the overall scale of the projects.
## ECONOMIES OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMMEDIATE AREA AND (REGION OR NATION)</th>
<th>CASE STUDY AND BRIEF DETAILS</th>
<th>GDP PER HEAD 2001 UK=100</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>AREA: 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| South Yorkshire (Yorkshire and the Humber) | Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC, University of Sheffield)  
A national research facility on a new campus                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | AREA: 74 REGION/NATION: 86 |
| Cornwall (South West)                | Combined Universities in Cornwall (CUC)  
In effect, a university for Cornwall, based on a network of existing South West HEIs and colleges and on major new campus investments                                                                                                                                                                           | AREA: 57 REGION/NATION: 89 |
| South Wales (Wales)                  | Community University of the Valleys (CUV)  
A small-scale venture by four South Wales HEIs intended to promote higher education in the former mining valleys of South Wales, one of the UK's most deprived areas                                                                                                                                                                      | AREA: 71³ REGION/NATION: 79 |
| East Lancashire (North West)         | Higher Education in East Lancashire  
A plan to develop higher education in this area, where there is currently little provision, by networking the HEIs in the surrounding area with the colleges in East Lancashire                                                                                                                                                     | AREA: 86⁴ REGION/NATION: 90 |
| Medway (South East)                  | Medway Campus  
A major new campus investment on the site of the former naval dockyard at Chatham, undertaken jointly by three HEIs                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | AREA: 69 REGION/NATION: 110 |
| Southend-on-Sea (East of England)    | Southend-on-Sea Campus  
A new campus development by the University of Essex in conjunction with an FE development on a similar scale                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | AREA: 80 REGION/NATION: 96 |
| Stoke-on-Trent (West Midlands)       | Stoke-on-Trent University Quarter  
A planned redevelopment of a large area of the Stoke-on-Trent conurbation through joint development across the FE and higher education sectors                                                                                                                                                               | AREA: 81 REGION/NATION: 90 |
| Lincolnshire (East Midlands)         | University of Lincoln  
An important recent example of a University campus being created from scratch in a sizable city with little previous higher education provision                                                                                                                                                 | AREA: 75 REGION/NATION: 92 |
| Tyneside (North East)                | Newcastle University  
A set of developments with a ‘Science City’ development at their heart                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | AREA: 87 REGION/NATION: 73 |
| Highlands and Islands (Scotland)     | UHI Millennium Institute  
A new type of HEI adapted to the requirements of a small population scattered over vast areas                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | AREA: 69 REGION/NATION: 95 |

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5 This figure is the unweighted average of the four NUTS3 areas where the CUV operates: Central Valleys (65) Gwent Valleys (62) Bridgend & Neath Port Talbot (75) and Swansea (83).
6 This figure is for the whole of Lancashire, of which East Lancashire is considered to be the least prosperous part.
At least five cases are the most important single projects in their respective areas, in the estimation of their HEIs and local and regional partners. Table 4 opposite gives further characteristics of each. Three (Lincoln, Southend-on-Sea and Medway) are large new campuses in comparatively small urban areas; and two (Combined Universities in Cornwall and UHI Millennium Institute) are in deprived rural areas and recognised as being the key to regeneration there.

The remaining five projects are each very important to their respective areas, but for differing reasons are not the ‘most important’ projects. The Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC) and the Community University of the Valleys are too small to enjoy that status in the relatively large areas that they serve. And although Newcastle University project is much larger in scale it is the only case study set in a ‘regional capital’, and its relative importance is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE STUDY</th>
<th>CAPITAL EXPENDITURE £M PROJECT</th>
<th>CAPITAL EXPENDITURE £M ASSOCIATED FE</th>
<th>STUDENT HEADCOUNT</th>
<th>COMMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC, University of Sheffield)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Plans not sufficiently far advanced for quantification. Student numbers likely to be large, but capital expenditure modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Universities in Cornwall (CUC)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>One half approximately of the capital expenditure is committed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community University of the Valleys (CUV)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>The FE expenditure has been incurred; £35m of the HE expenditure is incurred/committed and this will accommodate 1,500 students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education in East Lancashire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Plans are at an early stage. The capital expenditure figure is quoted in documentation, but not its split between FE and HE. Student numbers are not quoted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medway Campus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>The FE expenditure has been incurred; £35m of the HE expenditure is incurred/committed and this will accommodate 1,500 students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southend-on-Sea Campus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>There were 5,500 students in 2003/04, but further expansion is planned. Within the UHI model, much of the capital expenditure is UHI-funded but within FE colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent University Quarter</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Firm plans for Science City were not available at the time of writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>There were 5,500 students in 2003/04, but further expansion is planned. Within the UHI model, much of the capital expenditure is UHI-funded but within FE colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Lincoln</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Firm plans for Science City were not available at the time of writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle University</td>
<td>&gt;100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Firm plans for Science City were not available at the time of writing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Some figures are not available, others are estimates and all of them depend on definitions. Readers are referred to the text of the case studies for details (pages 21-40).
correspondingly less than if it were in, say, Lincoln. Higher education in East Lancashire is at a planning stage and seems unlikely to involve large-scale capital investment. Finally, the Stoke-on-Trent University Quarter may turn out to be the single most important investment in Stoke-on-Trent, but it is simply too early to say.

**FACTORS AFFECTING PROJECT SUCCESS**

*‘Local’ financial support*

HEIs are, of course, independent corporations with their own resources to invest. They can also call on the funding councils for financial support. Where a case is made, they may also be able to win financial support from their local authority or authorities, and from their Regional Development Agency (or equivalents outside England), from EU funding programmes, and occasionally from other agencies; sometimes financial support is forthcoming from business as well.

Although this is straining a point with respect to the funding councils, these sources might be described as ‘local.’ Several of the case studies have required substantial non-local funding to proceed, and it seems that the Government – and the funding councils in exceptional cases – require evidence that local funding has been maximised before they will countenance national funding.

To cite three examples, it appears unlikely that UHI would have received Millennium Commission funding, or that the Combined Universities in Cornwall would have received at least moral backing from central government, or that the University of Lincoln would have received the necessary Hefce funding, without convincing evidence of local funding support.

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**SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF CASE STUDIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE STUDY</th>
<th>MAJOR CAPEX</th>
<th>MANY STUDENTS</th>
<th>‘MOST IMPORTANT’ PROJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC, University of Sheffield)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Universities in Cornwall (CUC)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community University of the Valleys (CUV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education in East Lancashire</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medway Campus</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southend-on-Sea Campus</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent University Quarter</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Lincoln</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle University</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** ‘most important project’ means that the project is expressly recognised as the single most important economic regeneration project in the case study area, though sometimes equally with others.

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7 Their administration is complex; control rests in principle with Programme Management Committees comprising numerous partners (including HEIs), but ultimately with the UK Government, represented by Government Offices for the Regions or the national authorities outside England; day-to-day administration is often devolved to local authorities.
Conflict and Negotiation

All of the case study projects required (or will require) financial support from outside the core HEI. In many cases a package of financial support has been assembled.

All ten case studies are partnership projects. Table 5 below shows the main partners engaged in each. It is not intended to be comprehensive, nor to include the many agencies with limited connections to the projects; for instance Business Link is not listed against any specific project but has some involvement with most of the English case studies. This table illustrates the varying complexities of partnership arrangements.

Relationships between partners were often fraught with difficulty. Such difficulties were indeed one of the main subjects of the author’s consultations with the individuals listed at Annex 1. But partnerships almost invariably present a united front in public: there may be a bitter conflict, well known to all concerned, between two organisations that are at the same time publishing optimistically-titled vision or strategy documents that emphasise their unity of purpose. They would often deny any public suggestion that conflict was taking place.

**TABLE 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE STUDY</th>
<th>PARTNERSHIP INCLUDES8:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC, University of Sheffield)</td>
<td>University of Sheffield; Boeing Inc; South Yorkshire Objective One Partnership; Yorkshire Forward (RDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Universities in Cornwall (CUC)</td>
<td>Universities of Exeter and Plymouth and University College Falmouth; Cornwall county council; Cornish district councils; Cornwall Objective One programme; South West RDA; Government Office for the South West; Hefce; partner colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community University of the Valleys (CUV)</td>
<td>University of Wales, Swansea; University of Wales, Newport; University of Glamorgan; Open University; West Wales and the Valleys Objective One programme; between 10 and 20 community learning organisations; local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education in East Lancashire</td>
<td>County, unitary and district local authorities (15 in all); Government Office for the North West; North West Regional Development Agency; three regeneration partnerships; Hefce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medway Campus</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Thames Gateway; South East England Development Agency (RDA); Hefce; Medway Unitary Authority; Mid-Kent College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southend-on-Sea Campus</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Thames Gateway; East of England Development Agency (RDA); Hefce; Southend-on-Sea Unitary Authority; South East Essex College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent University Quarter</td>
<td>Hefce; Advantage West Midlands (RDA); Stoke-on-Trent City Council; two FE colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Lincoln</td>
<td>Hefce; Lincoln City Council; Lincolnshire County Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle University</td>
<td>Newcastle City Council; One North East (RDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
<td>Scottish Funding Council (SFC); 12 partner FE colleges; Highlands and Islands Enterprise; Millennium Commission; local authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 This is not intended as a comprehensive list.
For the reasons already summarised, this study cannot describe individual conflicts. But the following general points may be made:

- Inter-organisational conflict in major partnerships is universal. Experience suggests it cannot be eliminated, but can be managed more or less effectively.
- The case studies were selected on the basis that they were successful. As one would expect, therefore, conflicts between stakeholders were being managed effectively. However it might be useful to note that several of the projects had almost failed to come to fruition, in the past, because of conflict between partners.
- Conflict reported within this study tended to be between organisations of similar type: between one HEI and another; one government agency and another; or one local authority and another.
- The potential for conflict is related to the numbers of organisations involved. For instance, the case studies involving several HEIs, or multiple local authorities, faced greater challenges than those with a single HEI and just one or two local authorities.
- Higher Education is frequently seen as a possible arbiter in partnership ventures. In several cases, a senior member of university staff was leading a regeneration partnership as the most acceptable of various possible choices.
- The HEI staff interviewed for this study all saw their partnership negotiating skills as central to the successes that had been achieved, though their negotiating tactics differed.

The use of influence

Most of the case study projects are outside the normal decision-making framework of at least one of the partners involved. For instance, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) agreed to invest substantial sums in the Southend-on-Sea and Medway campuses, when on the face of it ODPM has no remit to invest in higher education. The rationale is economic regeneration, where ODPM does have a remit. It should, however, be noted that it took some time to persuade ODPM of the case.

Even where there is a remit for public funding, there is often a difficulty with the quantum of funds required. An RDA, for instance, may well wish to promote a new higher education development, but baulk at a required investment of say £10m that can be made only at the expense of other projects. There may be more technical difficulties, for instance where none of a group of partners will agree to be the first to commit funds, or where there are requirements for funding from a particular source to be ‘matched’ as with most EU Structural Fund’s expenditure.

Nonetheless, in at least four of the case studies (the two ODPM Thames Gateway cases, i.e. Southend-on-Sea and Medway; the Combined Universities in Cornwall; and the UHI Millennium Institute), government intervention was secured at crucial points, and the same may perhaps be true of several of the remaining six cases. In many cases central government has to be involved when HE, local and regional resources have been exploited to the uttermost. In relation even to the largest projects, central government has in practice unlimited resources. But every pound of expenditure has an opportunity cost; and, perhaps more importantly, ad hoc intervention by central government risks setting a precedent for the future. The case for intervention must therefore be carefully made.

There were also difficulties unrelated, or not directly related, to finance arising within the partnership. Examples would include planning difficulties and ‘turf wars’ between, for instance, local authorities or regional agencies.

In the case studies, difficulties of the kinds described above have sometimes been resolved through what might be described as the legitimate use of influence. To use a rather old-fashioned term, some projects benefited from the involvement of establishment figures. They are typically expert at marshalling a case, presenting it effectively and knowing to whom it can be presented with most effect, whether it be ministers, Whitehall civil servants or officials based in the regions or in agencies. Decisions are still made on merit, but at least the case is considered; without the involvement of ‘establishment figures’, it may not be heard at all. See Table 6 overleaf for a summary.

Involvement in regeneration partnerships is not without cost for HEIs. There may be cash costs, though these are likely to be relatively small – cash subscriptions to a partnership organisation, secondments of HEI staff and research provided without charge are typical items – but the more important cost is represented by the burden placed on the time of senior management. In several case studies, regeneration activity was said to take a quarter or more of the available time of the most senior managers (vice-chancellors and pro-vice-chancellors). Where the whole future of an HEI is intertwined with regeneration – as for example with University College Falmouth (CUC) or, a few years ago, with the University of Lincoln – this is unavoidable. But even where an HEI has a choice between avoiding regeneration activity (or in practice a minimal involvement) and close involvement, the case study HEIs were generally of the view that the ‘game is worth the candle’.

Recording events
During this study, it became apparent that even quite recent and important events could be forgotten or misremembered, especially once the individuals concerned move on. In several of the case studies, individual interviewees gave differing accounts of the same events. Some formal records, such as minutes of meetings or expenditure records, did not always record everything and were difficult to collate. In the UHI case study, there is a comprehensive account (Hills and Lingard) of ‘what happened’. The major effort required of the authors to compile that account is nonetheless small in comparison with the enormous scale of public expenditure on the UHI, potentially amounting to £100m in capital alone. Hills and Lingard is valuable both as an historical record and offering lessons for future large higher education projects. For both reasons, there is a strong case for suggesting that projects involving large-scale investment should be required as a condition of funding to produce such a record, and to plan for its production by accumulating records from the start.

### SUCCESSFUL LEADERSHIP OF REGENERATION PARTNERSHIPS

This section synthesises some of the lessons from the case studies and interviews about factors which contribute to successful leadership. Leadership by an HEI of economic regeneration may or may not involve activities of major direct importance to the HEI itself. These case studies did, however, all involve such activities, and the lessons from the case studies apply particularly to cases of this type. They may apply with less force, if at all, where an HEI is leading regeneration without a major involvement through capital investment or otherwise.

This section does not attempt to summarise the general characteristics of successful organisational leaders. Instead it discusses what features of leadership appear to be conducive to success in projects of the case study type.

Each case study project had to overcome many barriers. Positive and forceful leadership within the institutions involved was essential; without it, it seems unlikely that any of the projects would have succeeded. There are three case studies where the role of the vice-chancellor goes far beyond titular responsibility and where the case study...
project appears to have predominated, at least for a time, amongst the vice-chancellor’s responsibilities. These are the University of Lincoln, the Combined Universities in Cornwall and the UHI Millennium Institute.

In the remaining seven cases, the hierarchical level at which primary responsibility appears [to this author] to be proportioned relates approximately to the importance of the project. Responsibility for the Community University of the Valleys and for the Southend-on-Sea campus appears to sit at a level below that of pro-vice-chancellor, whilst in the remaining five cases responsibility sits at pro-vice-chancellor level.

The successful leaders seemed to

- build on firm foundations
- display conviction
- secure local support
- negotiate effectively
- mobilise influence
- create effective teams of experts
- balance costs and benefits appropriately

In discussing each of these factors below, this report gives examples of the methods used with reference to the case study content.

**Building on firm foundations**

Major projects invariably encounter scepticism. This can seldom if ever be wholly refuted by technical analysis, the uncertainties about variables such as future demand and capital costs are too great. But appropriate analysis can lend powerful support to a project. Examples include:

- student demand studies of the sort often required by Hefce11;
- cost-benefit analyses in line with HM Treasury’s Green Book12;
- research into the economic impact on a sub-region or region of a proposed higher education project;
- ‘Master Planning’ or similar physical planning exercises.

Whilst requirements differ from project to project, credible studies of these kinds give leaders the case on which they need to build.

**Displaying conviction**

The case study projects were typically large scale and innovative. None were small, incremental projects following a well-trodden path13. Their success or failure was subject to considerable uncertainty, however firm their research and planning foundations.

For instance, the transformation of the University of Humberside into the University of Lincoln required, amongst other things, a sufficient degree of acceptance of change amongst staff to ensure continuity, an ability to recruit students to the new campus, the continuing availability of finance and of planning permissions, and the effective management of construction so that facilities were available on time. The various experts employed to study these matters drew attention to the uncertainties in attempting to meet these requirements.

There is seldom, however, much value in emphasising the uncertainties. Once research and planning have reduced them to an inescapable minimum, effective leadership requires **conviction** – in the face of uncertainty, but on the balance of probabilities – that the project will succeed. Without this conviction, key audiences are unlikely to accept the case for the project. Many important stakeholders have little time or inclination to understand the subtleties of findings from research and planning. They wish to know whether the project ‘stacks up’ in a convincing way; the details and caveats are, to them, less significant.

**Securing local support**

The support of local partners is essential to major HEI projects. First, because of the direct benefits that they can offer such as financial support and planning permissions, and second because of the ‘endorsement’ that they offer when dealings are required with central government and its agencies.

The relevant partners change over time, and vary from project to project, but for this study include the following stakeholders within England and their counterparts in the other nations of the UK:

- regional government: currently GOR and RDAs;
- regional agencies such as the Learning and Skills Councils and Business Link, though at the time of writing both looked as if they were going through a transformation, illustrating the rapidity of institutional change;
- local government;
- local business;
- other agencies, such as Hefce regional offices, and in appropriate cases the relevant Sector Skills Councils.

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11 Hefce’s position on such studies is evolving, as discussed at an Hefce seminar: ‘Undertaking Demand for Higher Education Studies’, London, 2 June 2005.
13 The Community University of the Valleys was small scale but was a pioneering project rather than a replication of something elsewhere.
Support from these stakeholders – a ‘coalition of the willing’ – should be the starting point for securing national support from national agencies notably the funding councils, but also from relevant central government departments such as the ODPM, DTI and DfES.

These studies suggest that an especially effective, and sometimes indispensable, mechanism for securing support is the involvement of the most senior members of university management in the relevant local regeneration partnerships. It is not suggested, of course, that this is the only or even the primary reason for higher education involvement, but it promotes partner support for achievement of HEI objectives when this is required – whether for projects such as those in the case studies or otherwise.

**Negotiating effectively**

Major projects involve, as noted above, numerous partners with a corresponding need for negotiation. Effective leadership requires an ethical approach to negotiation, but this is consistent with appropriate use of negotiating tactics that allow incremental progression towards the desired end point. Indeed, a naïve approach to negotiation that eschews tactics is likely to fail.

**Examples** of the tactics employed by the successful leaders of the case study projects include the following.

- Planning a chronological order for contacts and negotiations: it will seldom be practical to describe a major development to all relevant stakeholders at once, and, for instance, some negotiations will need to precede others, whilst some may be conducted in parallel.
- Considering timing: negotiations over the case study projects typically extended over many years, sometimes things had to be done in a rush, perhaps to respond to some specific opportunity, but at other times a slower pace of negotiation was desirable.
- Building towards an end point: large projects usually proceed by incremental stages. Stakeholders may have differing views about the final end point and, at an early stage, later stages may be largely speculative. A leader may attain a desired end point to which few would agree in the early stages, by proceeding incrementally.
- Successful representation of ideas and positions: negotiators sometimes state their position in unequivocal terms, but more frequently they offer ambiguous, conditional or partial support for some course of action, perhaps because they are themselves unsure of what to do or say. How and how fully such positions are represented to third parties may bear significantly on collective perceptions of what is proposed.

**Mobilising influence**

The success of ‘unusual’ projects, once everything else is in place, frequently hinges on the support or agreement of a small number of senior officials or government ministers. Major higher education projects seldom have an indisputable justification. Rather they have a case to make. Assuming that this case is strong, acceptance depends on its successful presentation, i.e. on how the case is presented and the channels through which it is presented. Excepting where the HEI leader has excellent contacts already, friends of the HEI or locality can often be mobilised as channels to the decision-makers. They will typically be former ministers or former senior civil servants or others closely connected with the Whitehall machine.

**Creating effective teams**

The uncertainties inherent in major projects such as these have been summarised above. Uncertainty cannot be eliminated but can be reduced by effective planning and project management by suitably qualified experts.

**Balancing costs and benefits appropriately**

Cost-benefit analysis in the formal sense has already been discussed, but there is commonly also a wider balancing of costs and benefits at institutional level. An example of one decisive factor in striking that balance is whether the diversion of senior management time from the mainstream activities of the institution can be afforded (in the sense of managerial time and capacity rather than in any financial sense).
South Yorkshire and the University of Sheffield have a shared strength in advanced materials technology. Technological development in the industry is led by the Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC), a university venture in collaboration with Boeing, Rolls-Royce and other leading firms.

The AMRC’s research and development facilities are the centrepiece of an advanced manufacturing park some miles from the University campus.

This is one of the most important projects in South Yorkshire and is pivotal to the survival of the area’s manufacturing industries in the face of global competition.

**The context**

South Yorkshire is amongst the areas of the UK most affected by the decline of traditional industries. Coal, steel and engineering industries offered economic success until about 1980, but two decades of uninterrupted decline led to tens of thousands of job losses and transformed one of England’s most prosperous counties into one of the poorest.

The difficulties were recognised by EU regional policy. South Yorkshire is an ‘Objective One’ region for the EU Structural Funds. Such regions receive the highest level of assistance from the EU and, within England, only Cornwall, Merseyside and South Yorkshire qualify.

Throughout the severe difficulties since 1980, one bright spot has been the area’s continuing strength in special steels (and other materials) and techniques relating to them such as forging and welding. These materials and techniques are used for the most demanding applications in the aerospace and automotive industries and South Yorkshire is one of just a handful of areas with the requisite skills.

The University of Sheffield has its origins in the steel and related industries, through great benefactors such as Mark Firth and JG Graves. The modern university offers a comprehensive range of subjects but has always had great strength in metallurgy, engineering and related subjects, and especially in research relevant to an industry that although locally based has always had worldwide reach.

**The project**

In January 2001, the University of Sheffield and Yorkshire Forward (the Regional Development Agency for Yorkshire and the Humber) announced a £15m initial investment in the AMRC, intended to be the world’s most advanced centre for materials cutting technology. The project was to proceed in partnership with Boeing Incorporated, and was at the centre of an Advanced Manufacturing Park intended to create 4,500 jobs and spearhead the revival of manufacturing in South Yorkshire.

The general technological background was South Yorkshire’s centuries old expertise in metals and in edge-cutting technologies and the related expertise developed in the University of Sheffield. More immediately, the idea was promoted by Professor Keith Ridgway, who had for many years generated external funding in this field of work, for instance through the (then) Teaching Company Associate scheme, strongly supported by Professor Geff Tomlinson, pro-vice-chancellor for Research and himself an engineer.
At present the AMRC operates from a 1500m² ‘research factory’ some six miles from the university campus and has about 40 research staff. Current plans (August 2005) are to move to a facility four times as large and representing an investment of £40m, reflecting the strength of demand for the research centre’s services. Those services are offered on privileged terms to the dozen or so sponsor companies, and on commercial terms to other clients. The sponsor companies are 12 major firms in this technological field, including Rolls-Royce and Alcoa as well as Boeing.

The AMRC is unique – or at least very unusual – in the UK in its integration of world-leading university and commercial research. Whilst that is its purpose, it also has the effect of helping to secure the regeneration of South Yorkshire as the centrepiece of a large, modern industrial park, and as a critical element in the metals and materials cluster based in the county. This regeneration function has prompted the support of key agencies, especially Yorkshire Forward (the RDA) and the Objective One partnership.

The AMRC has been driven forward by technical experts in the University of Sheffield. It is, in a sense, a ‘motherhood and apple pie’ project to which few people if any would object. The question was always whether the necessary resources would be forthcoming given competing demands from other projects.

The project is consistent with the University’s aim, as one of Britain’s main research-led universities, to have world-class research in its key areas of strength. The wider project – the Advanced Manufacturing Park, with its 4,500 jobs – is much larger in absolute size than the AMRC alone, but the University’s leadership role has brought credibility and a sense of focus; without the AMRC as a centrepiece, it seems unlikely that the wider regeneration project could have been advanced in its current form.
The Combined Universities in Cornwall (CUC) is in effect a university for Cornwall, based at a £172m campus development near Falmouth but working throughout the county.

CUC is recognised by all partners as the single most important project in the regeneration of the depressed Cornish economy, and is the centrepiece of the EU Objective One programme for Cornwall.

The context

Cornwall has by far the lowest GDP per capita of any of NUTS2 sub-region of the UK. The county’s traditional industries of mining (tin, china clay, granite etc.), mining engineering, agriculture, fishing and tourism have all declined in recent decades.

The development of alternative industries has been impeded by the county’s physical remoteness from the core of the English economy and by the lack of a university. University College Falmouth (UCF) has a distinguished history, dating from 1902, in its own fields of Art & Design, Media and Culture but has, until recently at least, not been a full service university. Lack of a University was, perhaps, felt less in the years when Cornwall’s industries were successful and when higher education participation was lower. As those industries declined, and young people leaving the county for university then not returning turned into a flood, the problem became pressing.

The project

The obvious way to remedy the lack of a university in Cornwall would have been to create a new ‘University of Cornwall’. This would, however, have risked failing to build on existing higher education strengths: University College Falmouth, already located in the county; the University of Plymouth, separated from Cornwall only by Brunel’s Royal Albert bridge, and an easy commute for many residents of Cornwall; and the University of Exeter, the only ‘old’ university in the South West, with a formal mission ‘to act as a major resource for the South West of England’.

What were those strengths? The existing HEIs offered a series of advantages over a wholly new institution.

- The established credibility of their taught programmes and research.
- The opportunity to use their infrastructures as a basis for incremental development of a new higher education facility, – and the consequent mitigation of the immediate need for capital expenditure.
- The lobbying power of the HEIs and of their supporters, a topic that is discussed below.

As is often the case, even comparatively recent events are subject to some uncertainty, but it appears that a University of Exeter proposal in the mid-1990s to establish a base in Penzance was not warmly received in Cornwall and that this episode may have served to convince Exeter and perhaps Plymouth as well that the ‘outpost’ approach would not do. Cornwall wanted something of its own.

Accordingly, it was decided that a collaborative venture between the HEIs (Exeter, Falmouth and Plymouth) – ‘the Combined Universities in Cornwall’ – represented the best way forward. From the start, however, close connections with Further Education (and with the Open University) were envisaged and the model that was developed was described as being ‘Hub and Rim’. The Hub was represented by the three HEIs, and the Rim by higher education activities within the CUC but physically located within five Cornish further education colleges.

In the view of one interviewee for this study: ‘Cornwall needed staff, students, courses and buildings – the title, whether CUC, University of Cornwall or something else, was less important.’

The wish to have a university in Cornwall has been there for a long time. The opportunity was presented by the Objective One programme (and so, indirectly, by the relative decline in Cornwall’s economy). Cornwall County Council was very supportive as were the district councils in the exercise of their planning functions.

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14 EU derived classification of spatial units, at a county level.
15 Meaning here the South West peninsula, rather than the formal South West region, including Bath and Bristol.
16 www.exeter.ac.uk
Accordingly a funding package was assembled for Phase 1 of the campus development. The costs were £65m, of which Objective One was to contribute £25m and the Regional Development Agency £13m. The balance had to come from other sources including Hefce and the partner HEIs. After intensive efforts, there was a (relatively) small shortfall of about £5m. This was more significant than it seemed. Planned partner contributions were predicated on a £65m investment, and the Objective One contribution, for instance, would have been reduced if the £5m had been found by reducing the budget. The process by which success was eventually secured is summarised as follows:

- **Negotiation** secured the maximum possible commitment from higher education and its local and regional partners – though there was still a shortfall (i.e. the £5m mentioned above).

- **Influence** was brought to bear from senior civil servants and former civil servants closely associated with the project on their Whitehall and EU counterparts and on ministers – a strong case was presented effectively and through the right channels.

- **Operational management** – in the detail of the budgets it was found possible to obtain some of the funds needed for equipment from outside sources and to divert the savings to the main buildings budget.

The interviewees for this study indicated that each of the matters listed above was essential to success, as were the HEI partnership and the opportunity presented by Objective One.

Phase 1 was complete by 2001/02 and allowed student numbers to expand by 2,000. Phase 2 is even larger (£107m investment, including student accommodation and some business incubator units, making with Phase 1 £172m in all, and a further 2,500 students). The success of Phase 1 has, however, made it relatively easier to secure funding for Phase 2. By the time Phase 2 is complete in 2008, CUC will have in excess of 7,000 students – the original numbers at the UCF campus plus the 4,500 just mentioned from the two phases of development.
The Community University of the Valleys (CUV) is a network of four universities and numerous community centres that encourages people from the most deprived areas of Wales to take up Higher Education.

Although comparatively small in scale, it leads work in a particularly difficult field and offers a model for expansion in Wales and replication elsewhere.

The context
The valleys of South Wales are narrow river valleys flowing from the uplands of central Wales towards its south coast. They are the historical centre of the Welsh coal, iron and steel industries, activities which have now almost ceased. The typical pattern of settlement is a long village or small town strung out on the valley floor adjacent to a colliery site. In only a few cases – such as Merthyr Tydfil – are there larger settlements, and even Merthyr has just 60,000 people.

Communications between valleys are poor; to travel two miles as the crow flies from one valley to the next may entail a ten-mile journey by car and be a practical impossibility by public transport. Communications along the valleys are better, but even so, twisting roads and slow branch lines make for long journeys to the heartland of the Welsh economy on the coastal plain around Cardiff.

The valley communities have been shattered by industrial change. Many people have settled to a life on benefit – in some communities as many as a quarter of working-age adults are on Incapacity Benefit, the highest rates in the UK – and populations are declining as young people seek a better life elsewhere.

The area presents in short some of the most intractable regeneration problems anywhere in the UK. As a result, and specifically as a result of low per capita GDP as cited earlier in this report, the valleys receive the highest available level of EU funding support (Objective One funding). The CUV project has thus benefited substantially from EU funding, but a detailed investigation, beyond the scope of this study, would be needed to quantify the total amount of funding, spread as it is across numerous partners.

The project
The CUV is a network of four universities and some 25 community learning providers focused on widening participation in higher learning.

Its origins are in the ‘DOVE Workshop’, established in 1985 at Banwen (at the head of the Dulais Valley, some 25 miles from Swansea) to offer learning opportunities for women who had been involved in the miners’ strike.

In 1991 DOVE established an higher education access programme in partnership with the University of Wales, Swansea, intended to attract people from deprived communities. Whilst the programme was popular, many students were unable, because of their personal circumstances, to take up substantive higher education opportunities many miles away in Swansea, and a partial remedy was offered by the University’s delivery from 1992 onwards of a part-time Humanities degree at Banwen.

Since then the partnership has expanded to include the University of Glamorgan, the Open University and the University of Wales, Newport. In conjunction with the 25 community learning providers (of which DOVE was the first), the partnership is now able to offer higher education learning opportunities across the whole of the valleys area of South Wales.

The campus-based university partners (Swansea, Glamorgan and Newport) have more or less formal ‘territories’ within the CUV system (West, Central and East, respectively).

The community learning centres are all different. Learning may be their main activity or subsidiary to other activities. It takes place at all levels from basic skills to HE. Communities such as Banwen are small places and centre staff are often

\[17\] One deep mine remains. The two remaining steel works (at Port Talbot and Newport) in Wales are on the coast rather than in the valleys.

\[18\] The key criterion for the award of Objective One funding was per capita GDP lower than 75 per cent of the EU average, which during the reference period (1997-1999) was virtually the same as the UK average.

\[19\] The reports in the list of references give differing numbers. This particular figure (25) was cited at http://www.swan.ac.uk/dace/dace2/en/staff/rjones.asp when accessed in September 2005. The number fluctuates but around a growth trend.
personally known to a significant number of residents. These personal connections encourage take-up of learning opportunities.

Evaluation and similar reports\textsuperscript{20} indicate that the systems for tracking students across the learning centres are of variable quality. An evaluation report\textsuperscript{21} indicated that, where data were available, there were 168 higher education students across the CUV system in November 2002, representing 7 per cent of all learners at that date. A later ‘baseline’ study suggested that eleven of the learning centres had about 300 learners each per year on average, i.e. 3,300 in all. If the 7 per cent figure for higher education students applies to this population, the number of higher education students would be about 230\textsuperscript{22} in later 2003. A University of Wales Newport website\textsuperscript{23} accessed in September 2005 indicated that 900 students had accessed the CUV (East) higher education courses since 2000, an average of 180 a year. This may indicate some growth at CUV overall, but confirms the impression that the number of higher education students is in the low hundreds at any one time.

It is apparent from the figures cited above that the number of higher education students within the CUV frameworks is small when compared with the campus developments viewed elsewhere.

An important feature of CUV is the absence of central controls. A member university and one or more community learning providers could institute a new development — a degree programme, say — without the approval of any central CUV body, though this process is very probably limited in practice by the prevailing ethos of the CUV.

The valleys do not have an HEI campus, though the University of Glamorgan is on the fringe of the valleys area. There is, however, a long-standing plan to develop an higher education campus on the former Corus steelworks site at Ebbw Vale. This would certainly accelerate the pace of development within the CUV framework, though it would be of a more conventional kind than the current model.

The CUV operates in one of the most challenging fields of Higher Education: attraction into higher education of people from some of the most deprived communities in the UK. Against that background its successes appear creditable, if modest in scale. It leads this specific field, rather than the process of regeneration as a whole, and is a model of low-key collaboration between universities and community organisations.

Community organisations have premises including classrooms and basic ICT facilities throughout even the most deprived areas.\textsuperscript{24} They offer easy access to most people in those areas, both through physical proximity to their homes and less intimidating buildings than conventional university campuses.

Expansion has been slow. The modest current level of activity is the result of twenty years of expansion. In part this is because of the need to work through a partnership of many independent organisations, but in part too it is doubtless a function of the limited priority afforded to the CUV in its early years.

The key lessons from CUV are that it is possible to widen participation in even the most deprived communities. This is necessarily a slow process as the confidence and trust of those who can offer access to those communities is built, though it could, doubtless, have proceeded more quickly at CUV if greater resources had been available.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, Page 19.
\textsuperscript{22} Community University of the Valleys Partnership: ‘Report on the Baseline Study: progressing the CUV partnership project: May 2003-May 2005’. (See especially Page 12, which presents data in the form of a histogram, and as an ‘average number of learners per year’ without specifying a period, though the data are stated to be baselines gathered in Autumn 2003).
\textsuperscript{23} http://cuveast.newport.ac.uk/
\textsuperscript{24} Sparsely populated, deprived rural areas are a possible exception.
The lack of significant higher education provision in East Lancashire contributes to low participation in higher education by residents, and impedes economic development.

The University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN) chairs the newly formed Lancashire Economic Partnership and is leading with other universities and colleges the plans to develop higher education provision in East Lancashire.

**The context**

The geographical county of Lancashire is a small part of the historic county, following the removal from Lancashire of Greater Manchester, Merseyside and Furness on local government reorganisation in 1974. It has, nonetheless, a population of some 1.4m, resident chiefly in large towns such as Preston, Blackpool, Blackburn and Burnley. There is no dominant urban centre; Blackpool is the largest town with about 150,000 people, though Preston enjoys a certain pre-eminence as the seat of the County Council and of the University of Central Lancashire, one of the county’s two universities, and as the main communications hub.

Local government is complex. Over 80 per cent of the population lives in the administrative county of Lancashire, where a two tier system divides responsibilities between Lancashire county council and 12 district councils. Two Unitary Authorities, Blackpool and Blackburn-with-Darwen, make up the remainder of the geographical county. Few people are wholly satisfied with the current arrangements, and the existence of 15 local authorities with widely varying responsibilities, as well as the usual range of agencies, makes leadership of the economic regeneration process a challenging exercise.

Outside local government, the North West Development Agency (RDA), the Government Office for the North West and the local Learning and Skills Council (covering the geographical county) are the key regeneration agencies.

The economy is reasonably successful. Per capita gross value added (GVA) in 2002 was 83 per cent of the UK average, which is about normal for northern England though slowly declining (from 90 per cent in 1995). One highlight of the economy is advanced manufacturing, and especially the aerospace industry. Advanced manufacturing offers high productivity and highly skilled jobs though as throughout the manufacturing sector the prospects for employment growth are less good.

There is a distinction between West Lancashire and East Lancashire. West Lancashire contains the areas of greatest prosperity, especially in the Preston area and around Lancaster, which are home to aerospace and other advanced manufacturing industries and to service industries, including Higher Education and county administration.

East Lancashire, centred on the former cotton-spinning towns on the Blackburn-Burnley axis is markedly more deprived on average. Employment in the mills has largely disappeared and has been replaced, if at all, only by relatively low-paid employment in services industry such as warehousing and distribution. The population is ethnically mixed, and many women from Muslim backgrounds are reluctant to work or study outside the home or the immediate neighbourhood.

Like many former industrial areas that are not home to one of the great cities, the local economy suffers from the absence of high-level public sector activities, such as teaching hospitals, universities and government departments.

**The project**

Unlike the other case studies, this project is still at the planning stages. The ambition is both the economic regeneration of Lancashire as a whole, and the development of higher education in East Lancashire specifically.

East Lancashire is one of the few remaining areas of the UK with a substantial population but no HEI. The area is, however, comparatively small and almost surrounded by
the long-established universities in West Lancashire\textsuperscript{25}, Greater Manchester\textsuperscript{26} and West Yorkshire\textsuperscript{27}.

There are separate economic regeneration partnerships for East and West Lancashire\textsuperscript{28} but they are currently in the process of merger to form the Lancashire Economic Partnership. The process of partnership formation is complex, not to say fraught, with so many local authority and other partners and considerable rivalry between individual towns\textsuperscript{29}.

UCLAN is active in the regeneration of the county as a whole, reflecting the interests of the University, which draws half of its students from the county. In the context of this case study, Professor Alan Roff, the deputy vice-chancellor, chairs both the newly formed Lancashire Economic Partnership and the East Lancashire higher education group.

The choice of someone from Higher Education to chair the new partnership is doubtless due in part to Professor Roff’s skills and expertise; partly too, however, higher education is seen as an impartial choice in a complex stakeholder environment.

The ‘project’ envisages the development of higher education opportunities in East Lancashire, but without a specific higher education campus. This approach, i.e. of not having an higher education campus, was stated by those consulted for this study to be at Hefce’s insistence. The model is for an expansion of the current system under which the five FE colleges in East Lancashire offer higher education in collaboration with various HEIs in the North West region. UCLAN has taken the lead, but is only one of several higher education partners.

At the time of writing, the precise scope and scale of higher education developments in East Lancashire was not yet clear.

UCLAN leadership, albeit with other partners, of the intimately linked processes of economic regeneration and higher education development in East Lancashire offers benefits to the area as a whole, especially as the University is a widely acceptable leadership choice. It has also enabled the University, with its partners, to craft a method of developing higher education in East Lancashire that makes best use of existing further education colleges and HEIs. Specifically, the development of a new campus in East Lancashire, perhaps on the lines of those in Southend, Lincoln and the Medway towns, has been rejected as a model.

\textsuperscript{25} UCLAN
\textsuperscript{26} The University of Manchester
\textsuperscript{27} University of Leeds
\textsuperscript{28} See www.lancashire-ep.org.uk, www.elp.org.uk or www.lancashirewest.org.uk, though in October 2005, substantive content was to be found only at the elp.org.uk and lancashirewest.org.uk sites.
\textsuperscript{29} The author has consulted many individuals in Lancashire, for this research study and others. There is no doubt about the existence of inter-organisational disputes, though nobody will go on the record about them.
The Medway Campus is a new £100m higher education campus operated by three HEIs on part of the former Chatham naval base. It is amongst the most important of the projects that are currently regenerating the deprived Medway towns.

The director of University of Kent provision at the campus is a past chair of the economic regeneration partnership, and the three HEIs are active leaders in the process of regeneration.

The context
The River Medway flows south to north through western Kent and into the Thames. The breadth of its estuary and the protection afforded by the complex access to its mouth led to the development of Chatham in the seventeenth century as Britain’s premier naval base.

For centuries, the economic life of Chatham and increasingly of its neighbours Rochester and Gillingham (the three form a single conurbation) was dependent on the naval dockyard and on a range of supporting and other port-related industries. The decline of the naval base after the war, and its final closure in 1984 with the loss of some 7,000 jobs in a relatively small conurbation, led to an ‘unwinding’ of the urban economy that is best measured by the fact that the unitary authority of Medway has a GDP per capita of just 69 per cent of the UK average, and this in the most prosperous of England’s provincial regions.

One of the area’s advantages, however, is proximity to the capital. In particular, it forms part of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister’s ‘Thames Gateway’, a vast area running eastwards from the London docklands on both sides of the Thames. In effect this is an overspill area for housing and economic activity from the capital, with the additional benefit that development there will ameliorate the generally depressed condition of the area. Pragmatically, it offers Gateway areas such as the Medway towns special access to ODPM regeneration funding.

The project
The project is the development of a new higher education campus on part of the site of the former naval dockyard at Chatham. The higher education partners are the University of Kent, the University of Greenwich and Canterbury Christ Church University, each of which has its own buildings on the Campus. A fourth HEI, University College for the Creative Arts, is due to join the existing three.

A formal start to the project was made by a KPMG demand study completed in 2000 which assessed the Medway district as having substantial unmet demand for HE. Following an in principle commitment to Phase 1 of the development a site masterplan was completed in 2002.

The costs of Phase 1 of the development were some £31m of which £8.6m were contributed by SEEDA, £3.95m by Hefce, £2.5m by Medway Council and £15m by the HEIs themselves. At the time of writing, a bid has been made to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for £15m from the government’s Sustainable Communities Fund to meet the whole cost of Phase 2.

Phase 1 accommodates something over 2,000 FTE students and Phase 2 is planned to add a further 1,000. From a regeneration perspective the further benefits from the two phases in total include creation of 900 new jobs and the remediation of eight hectares of previously derelict land. By 2010, there are expected to be 10,000 higher education students on the Campus, about 6,500 full time and the balance part-time, requiring an as yet unquantified further investment in higher education facilities.

MEDWAY CAMPUS (see note for websites30)

30 Each of the three HEIs operating from the campus has its own website, see: www.kent.ac.uk/studying/where/medway/ukm.html www.gre.ac.uk/about/campus/medway.htm and www.canterbury.ac.uk.

31 The main dockyard site is owned by SEEDA and is some 140 hectares or 356 acres. Of this the HE Campus occupies eight hectares – a large area in itself but small in relation to the vastness of the former dockyard. Much of the remainder of the site is occupied by blue chip companies, and there are also shopping and leisure facilities – but much remains to be developed.

32 For the purpose of a rough headline figure, this has been assumed to be an amount equal to the investment of £47m already scheduled, making for a total project value approaching £100m.
There is a parallel £45m further education development project by Mid-Kent College, with Learning Skills Council (LSC) funding support, that will eventually accommodate 4,000 FE students. This is closely integrated with the higher education project, the college sharing some buildings with the University of Kent.

The approach of the HEIs to the development has been to offer complementary rather than competing curricula. In general, this presents few difficulties given the different characteristics of the three HEIs concerned, though in some important areas, such as business education, it has proved difficult to decide ‘who does what’. The HEIs each have their own academic courses, though the Medway School of Pharmacy is a genuine collaborative venture between Kent and Greenwich.

Medway Council has been a key partner in the development. It came into existence as a unitary authority in 1998 and has consistently been willing to make Higher Education a high priority – a commitment backed by substantial funding and a co-operative approach to planning matters rather than being purely verbal.

The HEIs have in turn seen themselves as fully committed to the economic regeneration of the area, engaging in sponsorship of events, adapting their curriculum offer to the skill needs of the area (in accordance, for instance, with SEEDA’s Skills Action Plan) and being willing to manage their activities so as to demonstrate consistency with a range of policies such as the North Kent Area investment Framework. A symbol of this commitment was the fact that Dr Jeff Brown, director of the University of Kent’s Medway Campus was the chairman for some years of the Medway Regeneration Partnership.

The Medway Campus is a major venture. The factors that have led to its success may be summarised as follows:

- the willingness of the local authority, ODPM and the Regional Development Agency (SEEDA) to prioritise the project for funding;
- ministerial intervention, to ensure that the project went ahead despite difficulties;
- the willingness of the three HEIs to play a role in the wider regeneration activity of which the campus is one part;
- the ability of the HEIs to avoid conflict where practicable and to resolve, where necessary at vice-chancellor level, the tensions that do inevitably arise.
Southend is being transformed by major investments in further and higher education. A £52m FE campus opened in September 2004, and the University of Essex has embarked on a phased series of developments to 2012, the first of which is planned to open in September 2006.

This ‘academically integrated further and higher education campus’ is the centrepiece of the regeneration of Southend.

The context
The famous Essex resort of Southend-on-Sea has been a holiday destination of choice for Londoners and others from the late nineteenth century onwards. But like all English seaside resorts, Southend has had to respond to the shift of the family holiday trade to overseas destinations, leaving the town with a less remunerative trade based on day trippers, short stays and older visitors. The population is approximately 160,000.

By 1995 the town was shabby and run down, especially the resort area immediately on the coast, though the inland parts of the borough enjoyed a degree of prosperity based on back-office financial services industries.

Southend, and especially the local authority, sees itself as a ‘city of culture’, albeit of a culture that has working class elements as well as culture in the ‘Sunday supplements’ sense. Education is part of that culture and the town has benefited from having a large FE college, South East Essex College. The college was based on a sixties campus a mile or so inland that also houses the main council offices. The college's premises were not well suited to modern methods of curriculum delivery and the opportunity was taken to build a major new college building in the centre of the seaside resort; this opened in September 2004. This £52m investment was the first phase of a further and higher education campus in the centre of Southend.

The project
The University of Essex is one of England’s smaller universities, and has ambitions to grow. Its home county of Essex, with a population exceeding 1.6 million and no other university wholly within its boundaries, is an obvious market.

Southend-on-Sea is the largest town in Essex and the very deprivation described above can be an opportunity for universities and others in that there is not only a ‘widening participation’ market, but also the possibility of winning regeneration funding.

The University of Essex already has a modest operational base in Southend (Princess Caroline House) offering courses in enterprise and in cultural industries as well as access to the wider offerings of the University as a whole. And reflecting the actual and planned linkages with the College, and in particular the plan to have some 1,500 franchised higher education students there, the University has contributed modestly to the cost of the new college development, as indeed has Hefce.

The University’s ambitions are set out in Vision 2012, which envisages a multi-phase development based on a central campus (Phase 2 – Phase 1 being the FE development), followed by students residences, a conference centre, a cultural centre, a school of health and medicine, an international business school, and a research and development park. Phase 2 is already under way at a cost of £30-35m and is planned to be complete and to have 1,500 students in 2006. The remaining phases are not yet formally committed, but will involve further expenditure of tens of millions of pounds in the period to 2012. Five thousand students are planned for 2010.

Funding for Phase 2 has been secured from ODPM (£14m), the East of England Development Agency (RDA) (£4m), EU Objective 2 funding (£2.5m) and Hefce (£3.7m), as well as the University and other partners. The challenges and opportunities in assembling this funding package included the following:

- the potential conflict between the College and the University as suppliers of higher education services;

33 And earlier, to a limited extent. Queen Caroline lived there in 1803 and her home then is the base for the University of Essex now.
34 Though Anglia Ruskin University has one of its two main campuses at Chelmsford in Essex.
36 As is often the case, precise costings are available but the total depends on what is or is not included by way of ancillary facilities.
• the initial reluctance of ODPM to fund higher education capital expenditure;
• the ‘serendipity’ - the word used by one interviewee - of ODPM Thames Gateway regeneration funding coinciding with the ambitions of the University and the regeneration needs of Southend-on-Sea;
• the need to make the market case for a campus serving the whole of South Essex (recalling that the main University of Essex campus is at Colchester in north Essex) rather than local authority ‘ownership’ being confined to Southend-on-Sea alone, but nonetheless…
• …the willingness of Southend-on-Sea Unitary Authority to promote the campus as vigorously as possible.

These challenges were not met without conflict ‘punch-ups’ in meetings; and one agency\(^\text{37}\) agreed to contribute only when it became clear that failure to contribute might mean that the agency would be blamed for a collapse of the whole project.

The University’s objective is to secure expansion, and also the regeneration of Southend-on-Sea, though inevitably the regeneration objective is subordinate to the University’s primary purposes. University leadership is nonetheless vital to regeneration since without a substantial higher education presence, it is difficult to see how the education-led renewal strategy for the town can be implemented. It is this ‘leverage’ that has enabled the University of Essex to secure the substantial funding described above.

\(^{37}\) Confidentiality precludes saying which.
In the complex urban geography of Stoke-on-Trent, the University of Staffordshire and two FE colleges occupy, with housing and other activities, an area of some 400 acres between the main retail centre (Hanley) and the town of Stoke itself.

The whole area – housing and academic buildings alike – is run down. The University and its partners have prepared comprehensive plans for redevelopment, which are the centrepiece of a proposed education-led regeneration of the conurbation.

The plans have the support of key partners, but the funding package needed for their implementation is still being assembled.

The context
To most people, Stoke-on-Trent means ‘pottery’, and the city is indeed the historic centre of that industry in the UK. Pottery is now, however, a fairly small employer in the city and related industries such as coal mining have disappeared or declined as well.

The Stoke conurbation comprises Stoke-on-Trent Unitary Authority with a population of 250,000 and the adjacent town of Newcastle-under-Lyme, with a further 125,000 people. The conurbation has, therefore, approaching 400,000 people, about the same as Bristol. The population is however distributed amongst various settlements – famously ‘the five towns’ – of which Hanley is the largest and Stoke-upon-Trent is relatively small, and this division has perhaps impeded recognition of the conurbation as a whole.

At any rate GVA per head of population has fallen to 80 per cent of the UK average, markedly below the average for the West Midlands region. The city, moreover, has experienced unusually adverse socio-economic statistics in other fields, such as pupil achievement at GCSE.

As in many industrial cities, the edge has been taken off Stoke’s industrial decline by the presence of two universities, though as so often in Stoke the position is more complex than elsewhere. Keele University is in Newcastle-under-Lyme district, though as already noted Newcastle forms part of the Stoke conurbation, if not of the administrative district, and the University of Staffordshire, though having its main campus in Stoke-on-Trent, is perhaps associated more with Stafford than with Stoke.

The project
The Stoke campus of the University of Staffordshire is close to a general Further Education College and to a Sixth Form College. The three form in effect a single campus, though one that includes significant areas of generally poor quality housing. The campus is adjacent to the mainline railway station and to the A500, which is a dual carriageway loop connecting two junctions of the M6 motorway. Communications are therefore excellent.

The vision document and associated press releases and similar documents envisage the transformation of the whole area, with an indicative cost of £100m. The document envisages the sharing of curriculum, facilities and services across the three FE/HE institutions, and capital projects including:

• relocation/redevelopment of the two colleges;
• development of a ‘Knowledge Hub’, incorporating the University’s library facilities, and representing an iconic centrepiece for the campus;
• a Centre for Creative Industries, Design, Media and Performance;
• business space;
• ‘supporting’ investment for instance in car parking and shuttle transport.

In addition to the £100m, substantial investment is expected from the Housing Renewal Fund. This will form part of the package but is not directly connected to higher education provision.

At the time of writing, the key commitment to the project is by Advantage West Midlands (the RDA), which has offered £11m towards the cost. Contributions are also expected.
according to the vision document, from Stoke-on-Trent City Council, Hefce, the LSC, DfES and others: at present, however, there are no firm commitments. Substantial private sector investment is also expected and with that in mind a development partner is to be appointed.

It will be apparent from the above that although discussions have been going on for at least three years, the project is at an early stage in what is expected to be a 15 year life. Leadership has so far been provided by Professor Howard Green, pro-vice-chancellor of the University, and other senior members of university staff including the vice-chancellor. In August 2005, the post of director of the University Quarter was advertised by the University at a salary of £60,000, and the existing informal partnership between the University, the two colleges, the City Council and funding bodies was in the process of being formalised.

It seems likely that the success of the University Quarter will, as in those case studies that are at a more advanced stage, depend on the ability to make the educational and regeneration cases for expenditure to the funding agencies, and on the negotiating and influencing skills of the leaders engaged in the work.
The Scottish Highlands and Islands are an area of wilderness and low population density unique in the UK and rare in the EU. The decline of the area’s primary industries has given new impetus to long-standing plans for a university fitted to meet the unique challenges of this area.

Progress towards that goal is accelerating. At £100m, the UHI is, by a wide margin, the most important regeneration project in the Highland and Islands, and is well-placed to achieve university status in 2007.

The UHI is unique amongst the ten case studies in two important respects; first, it had a well-publicised crisis in the year 2000 that nearly de-railed the project; second, an exceptionally detailed and frank account of its origins has been published (Hills and Lingard).

The context

The Highlands and Islands of Scotland form the UK’s only true wilderness, far larger in size than, say, the three regions making up northern England, but with only one-thirtieth of their population. A comparable sparsity of population is found in only a few locations within the EU – such as northern Finland or northern Sweden.

The sense of emptiness is reinforced by the concentration of the region’s 600,000 people in Inverness, Perth and Nairn. Elsewhere, population density falls to very low figures, small towns and villages being separated by vast tracts of land studded only intermittently by hamlets and isolated dwellings.

The regional economy is characterised by dependence on primary industries (agriculture, forestry, fishing and minerals) and tourism, with the three main towns operating primarily as service centres, though with some manufacturing as well. The North Sea oil activities on the Shetland Islands are an exception to the general pattern.

Employment levels are high but wages and productivity are low, producing one of the UK’s lowest levels of per capita GDP. Until 1999, the region had EU Objective One status and since then has enjoyed a measure of EU support under the Highlands and Islands Special Transitional Programme, though this expires at the end of 2006 and it is uncertain what if anything will replace it.

The underlying difficulties affecting primary industries and tourism throughout the UK have borne heavily on the Highlands and Islands and recovery is impeded by the extreme remoteness of the area. Population is still falling in many areas, especially in the island groups, though there is some evidence of growth elsewhere.

The project

Plans have existed for a university in northern Scotland for almost 600 years. In modern times, Inverness lobbied in the 1960s to be the base for Scotland’s fifth university, but lost out to Stirling. The idea was revived in the 1980s and from 1993 when UHI Ltd was incorporated, there have been firm plans to create a University of the Highlands and Islands.

The plans were reinforced by the Millennium Commission’s 1996 decision in principle to grant £33m towards the cost. The UHI is a Higher Education Institution. Although it is not yet a university and does not yet have degree-awarding powers, using the validation services of the Open University for its current and growing portfolio of 30 undergraduate and postgraduate degrees, it anticipates achieving degree awarding powers in 2006 and university status in 2007.

The UHI is already comparable in scale to other small HEIs, having a student headcount of 5,220 in 2003/04.

The UHI emphasises that it is ‘not a virtual institution’, it has ‘real buildings, staffed by real people and located in real places’. It must, however, cope with the challenges of a tiny
population scattered over an area said to be as large as France! As a result, it uses the facilities of its 12th partner FE colleges to deliver its courses through a network of 50 outreach learning centres, and makes extensive use of technologies such as videoconferencing, where the UHI claims to account at times for more than half of all videoconferencing use by UK HEIs.

The ability to offer non-virtual provision over such wide areas is central to the UHI’s ability to deliver its remit, but urban concentration is apparent even in northern Scotland, and Inverness, Nairn and Perth account for 80 per cent of registered students.

Capital funding for UHI, either incurred or planned, has amounted to about £100m, including the £33m from the Millennium Commission already mentioned, substantial sums from the (past) EU Objective One programme for the Highlands and Islands, and with £13m from Highlands and Islands Enterprise as the main central element of capital funding.

Revenue funding is from the (now) Scottish Funding Council, with its dual further and higher education remit. A particular difficulty for UHI is that the higher education funding system, unlike that in FE, makes no allowance for the additional costs of delivery in remote rural areas. As much UHI funding is transferred to further education partners in exchange for services, the low rates paid for those services have been a bone of contention, with some FE partners saying that they offer the courses out of ‘altruism’ rather than because costs are met.

Despite its long genesis and widespread support in Scotland, the UHI has faced various difficulties en route to its present status. Much the most serious difficulties arose in the late-1990s. (Those interested in the details should refer to Hills and Lingard.) In essence, they amounted to a failure in the negotiating and influencing skills that have brought success in many of the case studies reviewed here, as well as more prosaic failures of management. Things culminated in reports of alleged serious difficulties in the management of the UHI in the (Scottish) Herald newspaper and a debate in the Scottish Parliament at which these difficulties were aired; the UHI began to be referred to as the ‘Scottish Dome’. In the circumstances, the resignation of the then chief executive (in 2000) and the deferral for some years beyond the planned date of 2001 of designation as a university and degree awarding powers became inevitable.

In late 2001, Professor Robert Cormack was appointed director and chief executive of the UHI Millennium Institute, after Sir Alistair MacFarlane had acted for about a year as interim chief executive. It is sufficient to say that despite the unpromising initial circumstances, Sir Alistair and Professor Cormack have put the project back on track, leading to the successes described above.

This short case study is no substitute for the 272 pages of Hills and Lingard, insiders with a detailed knowledge of the UHI and its history. Like several of the case study projects, the UHI has required the investment of approximately £100m of public funds. Although great effort attended the writing of Hills and Lingard, that effort was small in relation to public expenditure on the project. In this author’s view, the preparation of such a book or report should be a funding condition of these enormous projects.

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44 A dramatic claim — and most of the area served is sea. However, the distance from Argyll to Shetland is indeed comparable to that between Bordeaux and Calais and much less well served by transport facilities.
45 See: UHI Millennium Institute: ‘Review 04: creating the University of the Highlands and Islands’; [Summary annual report for 2003-04].
46 At this time controversy over the Millennium Dome in England was at its height, and the UHI had received the largest Lottery Commission grant in Scotland.
The University of Lincoln is, in effect, a new university in a small city famed for its cathedral but actually dependent on engineering and other declining industries.

The University is by far the largest recent development of any kind in Lincoln and has transformed the city. For a time, the city’s economic regeneration partnership was chaired by the vice-chancellor and senior university staff remain intimately involved with the leadership of regeneration in both Lincoln and Lincolnshire.

The context

Lincoln is a small city with a population of about 80,000. Located where the River Witham penetrates the limestone escarpment of Lincoln Edge, the upper part of the city on the Edge itself has one of England’s finest cathedrals and superb medieval and Georgian buildings.

The lower town has been a focus for communications since Roman times, with river, canal and roads all using the natural gap in Lincoln Edge. This flat area was also the base for the engineering industries that formed the basis of Lincoln’s economy until quite recently. Those industries are now shrunken and just one large employer (Siemens) now remains. A huge inland dock, Brayford Pool, surrounded by warehousing for water and rail communications had also fallen into disuse.

By the mid-1990s, the city was in recession, with the tourism industries centred on the cathedral unable to compensate for the rapid decline in manufacturing employment.

The project

Lincoln, and Lincolnshire more generally, has long aspired to a university. The city made a determined attempt to secure a university during the 1960s and a range of stories are told – a mixture perhaps of truth and folklore – about how its ambitions were thwarted at that time.

In the early 1990s, a further attempt was made led by Lincolnshire County Council in association with local business leaders. Proposals to establish an higher education campus were invited from universities in neighbouring counties and an higher education partner was selected from those making proposals. Unfortunately, that partner later withdrew from the project and at short notice the (then) University of Humberside, based in Hull, agreed to take its place.

Plans were drawn up for a new campus on the Brayford Pool (see above), which opened in 1996. At that point the renamed University of Lincolnshire and Humberside had its principal academic and administrative base in Hull.

The institution was not, however, proving especially successful and by Autumn 2000 its full-time undergraduate numbers had shrunk to 6,500 from a peak of 10,000. It seemed to the incoming vice-chancellor, Professor David Chiddick, that decisive action was needed. He set in train the series of consultations and research that led to Lincoln becoming the university’s main base, with Hull in a secondary role, and a further re-naming to University of Lincoln.

The bare narrative conceals how the transformation was actually achieved. Money was crucial. When the University of Humberside became the higher education partner in the venture, it had cash resources of £25m; and the County Council was eventually able to commit approximately £17m in cash, donated property and other contributions. The City Council also contributed £1m, a sum broadly in proportion to the County Council’s given the enormous difference in size between the two authorities. Local businesses contributed several millions more, donations that were of great symbolic significance as well as being valuable as straightforward cash sums.

One way or another, therefore, ‘local’ resources amounting to between £40m and £50m were available. Moreover, the City and County Councils backed the project to the hilt, making for a supportive planning environment. Hefce agreement and support were also needed, and given, though apparently with reluctance and caution.

47 The city does have one of England’s smallest HEIs, Bishop Grosseteste College, but that has never been regarded as sufficient for the county and city.
It is not possible to say with certainty what would have happened under other circumstances, but in this author’s view the development at Lincoln would not have proceeded without the ‘local’ financial resources described above.

The modern University of Lincoln has a new campus in a new location and, substantially, a new complement of staff since its base moved from Hull to Lincoln. In all but a formal sense it is a new university and, as such, almost unique in the recent history of Higher Education in the UK.

As well as being a successful HEI, the University has been central to the regeneration of the city. The campus has been by far the largest investment in the area; its academic buildings and student residences cover a large area; the city centre has been transformed in terms of bars and shopping oriented to the student market; the housing market has been sustained by the influx of university staff; a wide area adjacent to the university campus has been developed for shopping, cinema, and restaurant use; and to a growing extent businesses directly associated with the university – especially with its media activities – have begun to develop.

The inter-dependence of the University and the city and county has always been recognised by the University. The vice-chancellor is a leading member of the Lincolnshire Assembly, was until recently chair of the Lincoln Strategic Partnership, and still chairs the Lincoln Futures Group, which recently produced the ‘Imagine Lincoln 2020’ vision document. Other senior members of staff are heavily involved as leaders of individual regeneration programmes.
Newcastle's universities, teaching hospitals, college, local authority and regional government bodies are the foundation of the city's economy. This case study concerns the University of Newcastle's Science City project (and related projects) pursued in partnership with the City Council and others and which are central to the city's continuing economic renewal.

The context

The historic city of Newcastle-upon-Tyne is the undisputed capital of Tyneside and of the north-east region as a whole. But although the Tyne and Wear conurbation is of substantial size (well over one million people), the boundaries of the city are tightly drawn and its population is only about 270,000, less, in fact, than Sunderland. The city has for decades been primarily a service centre, though in the past its famous shipbuilding and engineering industries were of much greater importance than now.

The modern day service industries include a large shopping and entertainment centre, but the most characteristic feature of the economy is the major public sector employers, central and local government and their agencies, the NHS teaching hospitals and the two universities, which taken together are out of all proportion to the city's size. The explanation is of course that they serve a large conurbation and its wider region, not just the artificially small city alone.

The project

In 2004, the Government designated six cities including Newcastle-upon-Tyne as ‘science cities’. It is for individual cities to bring forward detailed proposals for implementation of the science cities programme.

In Newcastle, a Science City partnership has been formed between Newcastle University, the City Council and One North East (the RDA). The centrepiece of the plan is a 100,000 square metres of new buildings provisionally called ‘Science Central’ accommodating world-class research, teaching and business facilities. Science Central will build on the University’s established expertise in technologies such as nanotechnology, bioscience and molecular engineering.

Science City will build upon the already successful Centre for Life: a life-sciences ‘mini-university’ located in an iconic building designed by Sir Terry Farrell and currently employing some 500 people.

The scale of Newcastle's Science City initiative is indicated by the prospect of 5,000 new jobs within five years and 15,000 in total by 2015, along with 250 new high technology businesses. At the time of writing, negotiations were under way with HM Treasury on the funding requirement. Although no figures have been made available to the author, 100,000 square metres of high technology space may be expected to cost at least £100m, and although much will doubtless be borne by the private sector, there will be many other costs as well.

Science City is at an early stage but is an example of the new approach to engagement with the City Council and others that has characterised the University in the last ten years and especially in the last five years. Before then, engagement was limited to the inter-action necessary between the two largest entities in the city. Since then, a steadily developing partnership has made an excellent start in the regeneration of the city, of which Science City is only the latest manifestation. Crucial impetus was provided to the process by Professor Christopher Edwards, vice-chancellor since 2001, and Professor John Goddard, deputy vice-chancellor, who has a long-term academic interest in regeneration as the founder of the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS) at the University.

Aside from the major science developments described above, the Cultural Quarter, based around theatres, museums and art galleries, some owned by the City Council, others by the University, is a second major area of activity. The Quarter was a cornerstone of Newcastle’s City of Culture bid, which although unsuccessful, has led to continuing development within the Quarter.

The time commitment associated with the University’s current heavy involvement in regional and local economic...
regeneration is substantial. The University views it, however, as substantially beneficial even from the narrow perspective of the University’s own immediate interests. The wider benefits for the city, from which in time the University will gain further, are still greater.
## ANNEX 1: INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED FOR THE STUDY

Note: under each case study, the key HEI interviewee appears first followed by other interviewees in alphabetical order of organisation.

### ADVANCED MANUFACTURING RESEARCH CENTRE (UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Role</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor Geof Tomlinson</td>
<td>AMRC, University of Sheffield</td>
<td>Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Lewis</td>
<td>Hefce</td>
<td>Regional Consultant (Yorkshire and North East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Noble</td>
<td>Yorkshire Universities Association (HERA)</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Brown</td>
<td>Sheffield First for Investment and University of Sheffield</td>
<td>Knowledge Transfer - University Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Roberts</td>
<td>Sheffield First for Investment</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### COMBINED UNIVERSITIES IN CORNWALL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor Alan Livingston</td>
<td>University College Falmouth</td>
<td>Principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Kelly</td>
<td>Combined Universities in Cornwall</td>
<td>Co-ordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sean Mackney</td>
<td>Higher Education Regional Development Association South West (HERA)</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Bohane</td>
<td>South West Regional Development Agency (RDA)</td>
<td>Head of Operations, Cornwall &amp; the Isles of Scilly</td>
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### COMMUNITY UNIVERSITY OF THE VALLEYS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhysian Jones</td>
<td>Community University of the Valleys</td>
<td>Co-ordinator</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### HIGHER EDUCATION IN EAST LANCASHIRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor Alan Roff</td>
<td>University of Central Lancashire</td>
<td>Deputy Vice-Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy Cookson</td>
<td>(A) Accrington and Rossendale College (B) Lancashire Partnership</td>
<td>(A) Principal (B) Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Taylor</td>
<td>East Lancashire Partnership</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Lightbowne</td>
<td>East Lancashire Learning Partnership</td>
<td>Partnership Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Jennifer Latto</td>
<td>Government Office for the North West</td>
<td>Special Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emma Creasey</td>
<td>Hefce</td>
<td>North West Regional Consultancy Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fran Hulbert</td>
<td>North West Development Agency (RDA)</td>
<td>Head of Skills</td>
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</table>

### MEDWAY CAMPUS

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<tr>
<td>Dr Jeff Brown</td>
<td>University of Kent</td>
<td>Director, Medway Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Blackwell</td>
<td>Hefce</td>
<td>Regional Consultant (South East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Jackson</td>
<td>Hefce</td>
<td>Regional Consultant (London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Jane Glanville</td>
<td>London Higher (HERA)</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Candlin</td>
<td>Medway Council</td>
<td>Economic Development Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHEND-ON-SEA CAMPUS</td>
<td>UNIVERSITY OF LINCOLN</td>
<td>NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Jones</td>
<td>University of Essex</td>
<td>Professor David Chiddick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derek Hicks</td>
<td>Hefce</td>
<td>Chris Lawton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Murphy</td>
<td>Southend-on-Sea District Council (Unitary Authority)</td>
<td>Jenny Kenning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Howard Green</td>
<td>University of Staffordshire</td>
<td>Tansi Harper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilary Chilton</td>
<td>Advantage West Midlands (RDA)</td>
<td>John Selby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gething</td>
<td>Stoke-on-Trent District Council (Unitary Authority)</td>
<td>Regional and European Strategy Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southend Campus Project Manager</td>
<td>Pro-Vice-Chancellor</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Consultant (Eastern)</td>
<td>Labour Market Analyst</td>
<td>Deputy Vice Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Economic Development</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>Regional Consultant (Yorkshire and North East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of HE Policy</td>
<td>Regional Consultant (East Midlands)</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Annibal</td>
<td>Lincolnshire Development (Lincolnshire County Council)</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire Development (Lincolnshire County Council)</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Robert Cormack</td>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
<td>Principal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Frank Rennie</td>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
<td>Head of Research and Post-Graduate Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Joe Irvine</td>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
<td>Research and Commercialisation Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX 2: GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMRC</td>
<td>Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre (University of Sheffield)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUC</td>
<td>Combined Universities in Cornwall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURDS</td>
<td>Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUV</td>
<td>Community University of the Valleys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Further Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>Full-Time Equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOR</td>
<td>Government Offices for the Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVA</td>
<td>Gross Value Added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hefce</td>
<td>Higher Education Funding Council for England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI</td>
<td>Higher Education Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERA</td>
<td>Higher Education Regional Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFHE</td>
<td>Leadership Foundation for Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>Learning and Skills Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>Local Strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODPM</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVC</td>
<td>Pro-Vice-Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Regional Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEDA</td>
<td>South East England Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Scottish Funding Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCF</td>
<td>University College Falmouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLAN</td>
<td>University of Central Lancashire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Urban Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHI</td>
<td>UHI resembles an acronym and for that reason is included here. It is, however, not an acronym and is symbolic in meaning. See <a href="http://www.uhi.ac.uk">www.uhi.ac.uk</a> for further explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Vice-Chancellor</td>
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</table>
ANNEX 3: REFERENCES
Details of the case studies appear at the web sites listed below. Other references appear in the text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE STUDY NAME</th>
<th>WEB SITE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre</td>
<td><a href="http://www.amrc.co.uk">www.amrc.co.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(University of Sheffield)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Universities in Cornwall (CUC)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cuc.ac.uk">www.cuc.ac.uk</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Community University of the Valleys</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cuv.org.uk">www.cuv.org.uk</a></td>
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<td>Higher Education in East Lancashire</td>
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<td>Medway Campus</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.gre.ac.uk/about/campus/medway.htm">www.gre.ac.uk/about/campus/medway.htm</a></td>
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<td><a href="http://www.canterbury.ac.uk">www.canterbury.ac.uk</a></td>
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<td>Southend-on-Sea Campus</td>
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<td>Stoke-on-Trent University Quarter</td>
<td><a href="http://www.staffs.ac.uk/universityquarter">www.staffs.ac.uk/universityquarter</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Lincoln</td>
<td><a href="http://www.lincoln.ac.uk">www.lincoln.ac.uk</a></td>
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<td>Newcastle University</td>
<td><a href="http://www.newcastle.ac.uk">www.newcastle.ac.uk</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>UHI Millennium Institute</td>
<td><a href="http://www.uhi.ac.uk">www.uhi.ac.uk</a></td>
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Glyn Owen

Glyn is an economist who has worked for Sheffield Hallam and Huddersfield universities, the Open University and for private sector firms and the European Commission. He is currently visiting professor of economics at the University of Lincoln and also runs his own consulting firm, Glyn Owen Associates. He has conducted numerous research and consultancy investigations into the economic impact of Higher Education and Further Education and his wider interests include microeconomic analysis of various aspects of the markets for education and training.